ed line far enough to meet and resist our attack. It was
not until some time after my orders for this movement had been
issued and should have been in progress of vigorous execution that
I received the first intimation that the question of rank had been
raised, as stated by General Sherman, and that my orders had simply
been transmitted to the division commanders of the Fourteenth Corps.

It cannot for a moment be admitted that any share of the blame for
that failure attaches to the Fourteenth Corps, as such. Nor do I
believe with General Sherman that its slowness on that occasion
was due to anything "imbibed" from General Thomas.

SHERMAN'S ERROR IN A QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK

My own view of military duty was different from that entertained
by the commander of the Fourteenth Corps, as was shown in my
subsequent action, hereinafter referred to, when I was ordered to
report to and act under the orders of General Stanley. But if the
distinguished statesman who then commanded the Fourteenth Corps
fell into error at that time, he has doubtless since regretted it
far more than any other man could possible do; and he has many
times atoned for that error by the great services to the country
which he has continued to render up to the present time.

The primary and principal cause of this and all similar difficulties
during the Atlanta campaign was the grave error of opinion which
disregarded the special rank of army and department commanders
given them by the President's assignment under the law, and the
still graver error of judgment in leaving such an important question
open until the eve of battle, in the "hope that there would be no
necessity for making this decision." This error seems incomprehensible
when it is considered that it in effect nullified the President's
selection of army and department commanders at the most important
of all moments, the crisis of battle, by making these commanders
subject to the orders of any general of older commission whose
troops happened to be adjacent to theirs.

In the midst of battle, when the orders of a common superior cannot
be obtained in time to meet an emergency, the highest commander
present must give the necessary orders and must be obeyed. This
is probably the gravest responsibility of war. Yet Sherman's
opinion and decision would have placed this responsibility, not
upon the army commander who had been selected by the President,
upon