ion and to raise
the question whether it is not applicable to reality as a whole. We
ask with respect to knowledge in general, and not merely with respect
to certain particular items of knowledge, whether we know or can know
reality, and not merely appearance. The two positions just stated are
alternative ways of answering the question in the negative. They are,
then, philosophical views based upon a distinction found in our
ordinary consciousness. Consequently, in order to decide whether the
distinction will bear the superstructure placed upon it by the
philosophical consciousness, it is necessary to examine the
distinction as it exists in our ordinary consciousness.

[14] I. e. the consciousness for which the problems are those
of science as opposed to philosophy.

The distinction is applied in our ordinary consciousness both to the
primary and to the secondary qualities of matter, i. e. to the size,
shape, position and motion of physical bodies, and to their colour,
warmth, &c. We say, for instance, that the moon looks[15] or appears
as large as the sun, though really it is much smaller. We say that
railway lines, though parallel, look convergent, just as we say that
the straight stick in water looks bent. We say that at sunset the sun,
though really below the horizon, looks above it. Again, we say that to
a person who is colour blind the colour of an object looks different
to what it really is, and that the water into which we put our hand
may be warmer than it appears to our touch.

[15] 'Looks' means 'appears to sight', and 'looks' is
throughout used as synonymous with 'appear', where the
instance under discussion relates to visual perception.

The case of the primary qualities may be considered first. Since the
instances are identical in principle, and only differ in complexity,
it will be sufficient to analyse the simplest, that of the apparent
convergence of the railway lines.

Two points at once force themselves upon our notice. In the first
place, we certainly suppose that we perceive the reality which we wish
to know, i. e. the reality which, as we suppose, exists independently
of our perception, and not an 'appearance' of it. It is, as we say,
the real lines which we see. Even the term 'convergent', in the
assertion that the lines look convergent, conveys this implication.
For 'convergent' is essentially a characteristic not of an appearance
but of a reality, in the sense in which