appearance.[12]'
[9] 'Things' is substituted for 'the reality which we believe
to exist independently of perception' in order to conform
to Kant's language. The substitution, of course, has the
implication--which Kant took for granted--that the reality
consists of a plurality of individuals.
[10] 'Things in themselves' has here to be substituted for
'things as they are in themselves' in the statement of the
negative side of the position, in order to express the proper
antithesis, which is now that between two things, the one
known and the other unknown, and not that between two points
of view from which one and the same thing is known and not
known respectively.
[11] _Erscheinung._
[12] _Schein._
An implication of this defence should be noticed. The issue relates
to the nature of space[13], and may be stated in terms of it. For,
since space is a presupposition of all other properties which the
non-philosophical consciousness attributes to physical things, it
makes no difference whether we say that things _only appear_ heavy,
hard, in motion, &c., or whether we say that things _only appear_
spatial. In the same way it is a matter of indifference whether we say
that, though things are not heavy, hard, &c., their appearances are
so, or whether we say that, though things are not spatial, their
appearances are so. The issue, then, concerns the possibility of
maintaining either that things only appear spatial, or that the
appearances which they produce are spatial, while the things
themselves are not, or, at least cannot be known to be, spatial.
[13] We might add time also; but, for a reason which will
appear later (p. 139), it can be neglected.
The tenability of these alternative positions has to be considered
apart from the argument of the _Aesthetic_, for this, as we have seen,
breaks down. At the outset it is important to realize that these
positions are the product of philosophical reflection, and constitute
general theories of knowledge. As has been pointed out, the
distinction between appearance and reality first arises in our
ordinary or scientific consciousness.[14] In this consciousness we are
compelled to distinguish between appearance and reality with respect
to the details of a reality which, as a whole, or, in principle, we
suppose ourselves to know. Afterwards in our philosophical
consciousness we come to reflect upon this distinct
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