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NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 9]

Whether an Individual Action Can Be Indifferent?

Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be
indifferent. For there is no species that does not, or cannot,
contain an individual. But an action can be indifferent in its
species, as stated above (A. 8). Therefore an individual action can
be indifferent.

Obj. 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in
_Ethic._ ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal
disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not
good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in
respect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.

Obj. 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil
belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain
a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end.
Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle
word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the
motive of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an
evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of
judgment" (Matt. 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just
necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is
either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either
good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.

_I answer that,_ It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent
in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil.
And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (A.
3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes
its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason
of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason
of his species. And every individual action must needs have some
circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the
intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct;
if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to
the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has
the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due en