ies on the part of the
internal action.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 7]
Whether the Species Derived from the End Is Contained Under the
Species Derived from the Object, As Under Its Genus, or Conversely?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from
the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when
a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its
species from its object, as stated above (AA. 2, 6). But it is
impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this
species be not contained under the proper species of that thing;
because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that
are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is
taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken
from the object.
Obj. 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most
specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to
come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is
something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is
contained under the species derived from the object, as its most
specific species.
Obj. 3: Further, the more formal a difference is, the more specific
it is: because difference is compared to genus, as form to matter.
But the species derived from the end, is more formal than that which
is derived from the object, as stated above (A. 6). Therefore the
species derived from the end is contained under the species derived
from the object, as the most specific species is contained under the
subaltern genus.
_On the contrary,_ Each genus has its determinate differences. But an
action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to
an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species
derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from
the object, as under its genus.
_I answer that,_ The object of the external act can stand in a
twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself
ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to
victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to
take what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving
of alms. Now the differences that divide a g
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