not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus
from containing a species which is operative in every other species
of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.

Reply Obj. 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so
far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:
but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are
the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 6]

Whether Prudence Appoints the End to Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral
virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in
the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral
virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the
appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral
virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but
he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts
of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to
irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures,
according to _Polit._ i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are
directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason
applied to action," as stated above (A. 2). Therefore all actions are
directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the
end to all moral virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral
virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while
prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not
belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to
regulate the means.

_I answer that,_ The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good
of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius
declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of
necessity pre-exist in the reason.

Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
naturally known, about which is _understanding,_ and certain things
of which we obtain knowledge