ommon to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is
not a virtue but a true opinion."

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Polit._ i, 5 that "a slave is not
competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good
counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or
subjects.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A. 8).
But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only
of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and
belongs to rulers, while the other "retains the common name
political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to
subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is
not only in rulers but also in subjects.

_I answer that,_ Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the
slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to
be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a
slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.

Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share
in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is
in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but
in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as
such.

Reply Obj. 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as
he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he
does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.

Reply Obj. 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also
himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 13]

Whether Prudence Can Be in Sinners?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For
our Lord said (Luke 16:8): "The children of this world are more
prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of