to
something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man
naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man
has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it
happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since
then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated
above (A. 6; I-II, Q. 57, A. 5), it follows that prudence is not from
nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to
prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had
said before (Ethic. vi, 5, 11) that "they are the principles of the
_ou heneka_" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)],
namely, the end; and so he does not mention _euboulia_ among them,
because it takes counsel about the means.

Reply Obj. 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their
natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but
also because of their long experience.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining
an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species
act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his
reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently
extends to an infinity of singulars.
_______________________

SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 16]

Whether Prudence Can Be Lost Through Forgetfulness?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through
forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is
more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of
action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is
prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same
things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now
the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of
many memories," as he states at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_
(i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems
that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

Obj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of
universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through
forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."

_I answer that,_ Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one
can forget art and science, so