fore it appears to proceed from that root of pride,
which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers
to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although
precipitation refers rather to the first.
Reply Obj. 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of
reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one
should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more
directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for
the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 4]
Whether Thoughtlessness Is a Special Sin Included in Imprudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin
included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any
sin, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and
yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matt. 10:19, "Take
no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a
sin.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to
many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and
therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is
contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is
not a special sin.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason,
viz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and
_command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts,
since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore
thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look
straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this
pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness.
Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.
_I answer that,_ Thought signifies the act of the intellect in
considering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs
to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in
speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise
judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research
by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.
Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack
of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far,
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