even as particular justice is towards another person
so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it
would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently
about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
about operations.
_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question may be gathered
from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from
the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4), for it is only the sensitive
appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not
about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the
irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the
matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we
are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions.
Therefore justice is not about the passions.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as
its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but
every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be
acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure
and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this
is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to
justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions"
(Ethic. i, 8).
Reply Obj. 2: External operations are as it were between external
things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are
their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one
of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may
steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing,
but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet
another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the
directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external
things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the
passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the
passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so
far as stealing is contrary to the equality that should be maintained
in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an
immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations
take their species, not from the internal passi
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