ose
who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person
(for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to
himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and
have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor.
Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in
intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his
own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make
restitution by renouncing his intention.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 6]

Whether He That Has Taken a Thing Is Always Bound to Restitution?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not
always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality
of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him
that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that
which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed
into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the
person that took it, but by the one that has it.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by
making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the
case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always
bound to restitution.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times.
Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one
of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing
is not always bound to restitution.

_On the contrary,_ He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now
restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a
thing is bound to restore it.

_I answer that,_ With regard to a man who has taken another's
property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the
taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as
long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in
addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to
him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the
other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may
be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of
the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound
to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of
the injurious action, even though the thing