man's life.

Reply Obj. 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which
comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending
yourselves--that is, not striking your enemy back."
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 8]

Whether One Is Guilty of Murder Through Killing Someone by Chance?

Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through
killing someone by chance. For we read (Gen. 4:23, 24) that Lamech
slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does
not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gen.
4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one
incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a
woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue
thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen
without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty
of murder through killing someone by chance.

Obj. 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons
prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not
due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs
the guilt of murder.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we
do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we
unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be
imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is
killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore
the person who did it is not accounted guilty.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance
is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance
happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary.
And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera
Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly
voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally,
according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental
cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide
results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of
voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes
another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which
he ought to avoid: secondly, whe