lerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity:
and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men
ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more
weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have
to judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their
justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be
believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly,
because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public
opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which
would be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a
sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and
manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 3]

Whether a Man's Evidence Can Be Rejected Without Any Fault of His?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be
rejected except on account of some fault. For it is inflicted as a
penalty on some that their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case
of those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be
inflicted save for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man's
evidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault.

Obj. 2: Further, "Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the
contrary appear" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a
man's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore
there can be no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of
his, it would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for
some fault.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for
salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to
give true evidence, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should
be excluded from giving evidence save for some fault.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): "As to the bishop
who is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know
that they should by no means have been heard": which words are
embodied in the Decretals (II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the authority of evidence is
not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one
side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the
other. Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened,
sometimes indeed