ate?
(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 1]
Whether an Advocate Is Bound to Defend the Suits of the Poor?
Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the
suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): "If thou see the ass
of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not
pass by, but shall lift him up with him." Now no less a danger
threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than
if his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate
is bound to defend the suits of the poor.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him
that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let
him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful
bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his
neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy
plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received
will be reputed a talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide but
faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by
the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Matt.
25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.
Obj. 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being
affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is
chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the
suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in
such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.
_On the contrary,_ He that lacks food is no less in need than he that
lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always
bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always
bound to defend the suits of the poor.
_I answer that,_ Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the
works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one
given above with regard to the other works of mercy (Q. 32, AA. 5,
9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those
who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28),
"since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly
who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of
chance are more closely unit
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