(for instance a blind man whose attendance in
a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill
becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the
justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill
repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous
crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is
outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead
either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with
them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own
church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot
direct them to do so.
Reply Obj. 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by
unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of
mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons:
thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and "too
little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less."
For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from
pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others
because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons
of ill-repute and unbelievers.
Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not
so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because
others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison
fails.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 3]
Whether an Advocate Sins by Defending an Unjust Cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending
an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing
a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can
defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a
desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but
ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.
Obj. 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin.
Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II,
qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by
defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.
Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to
use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false
witnesses, or alleging fa
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