orbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his
life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap.
Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who
conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former
because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to
hurt."

_I answer that,_ We must make a distinction in the matter of giving
evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary,
and sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject
to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to
obey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points
which are required of him in accordance with the order of justice,
for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If
however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance
secret matters, and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is
not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be
required by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must
make a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to
deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from
false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give
evidence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do
what he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby.
For it is written (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy
from the hand of the sinner"; and (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that
are led to death"; and (Rom. 1:32): "They are worthy of death, not
only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
them," on which words a gloss says: "To be silent when one can
disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's
condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is
constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice;
since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular
injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the
accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord:
whereas it is different with the accused, who incurs the danger
against his will.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a
case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to
declare the truth, and when such conc