more wicked than robbery.

Obj. 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it
would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by
theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is
possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft
seems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery.

_On the contrary,_ According to the laws robbery is more severely
punished than theft.

_I answer that,_ Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above (AA.
4, 6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person
from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the
involuntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to
violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than
through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the
will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than
theft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts
a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy
and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or
guile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection
is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of
external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal
virtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed
of robbery than of theft.

Reply Obj. 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by
robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than
by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.
_______________________

QUESTION 67

OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice,
that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider
(1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and
(2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.

Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The
injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor
in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself;
(4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The
injustice of the advocate in defending.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to
deliver