allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their
personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal
property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person
is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause.
Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, "There is no respect of persons with God
[Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not
persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on
account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due
cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone,
you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is
proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular
man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person,
since you give him something not for some cause that renders him
worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any
circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy
of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man
promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich
or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may
happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as
regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity
makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be
chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore
consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to
respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows,
accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive
justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but
sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances
of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of
persons we consider circumstances that do not so result.

Reply Obj. 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of
things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things
pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions
ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the
persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though
it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy,
absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.

Reply Ob