aken; since it
is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it
be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no
need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since
therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it
follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been
taken unjustly.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it
suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God
and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in
equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for
instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make
compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either
party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.

Reply Obj. 2: There are three ways in which one may take away
another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly,
as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order
of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by
saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore
that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly,
by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's
sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound
to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an
untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed
him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must
compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above
(ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be
undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its
effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the
opinion of other men.

Reply Obj. 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from
obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view
the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being
conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation
whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if
the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through
hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has
been definitely assigned to anyone, one