ness of heart.

Reply Obj. 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is
written (Deut. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on
(Deut. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not
judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom
[*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all
does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an
occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they
are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the
judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove
or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as
another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting
thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned
once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be
equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Unlawful to Form a Judgment from Suspicions?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion
about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that
suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible
to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars.
Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about
singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be
lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.

Obj. 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a
man's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the
injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not
unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an
injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A.
1). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus,
as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Therefore a judgment based on
suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
is false, because "we cannot avoid suspi