injures
and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure
another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have
evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him
good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

Reply Obj. 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may
happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err
frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less
frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in
the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

Reply Obj. 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge
of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good
or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take
no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there
is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly,
and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of
the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in _Ethic._ vi,
2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with
things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good
and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the
person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy
of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and
deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we
ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless
there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge
falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our
good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither
does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of
contingent singulars in themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the
best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we
have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in
order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure,
it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be
efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against
a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or
for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when
judging of things we should try to interpret e