tion is not an act of
commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.
Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.
Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be
restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and
passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution
would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away.
Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation,
but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man
less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of
commutative than of distributive justice.
_On the contrary,_ Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is
an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.
Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs
commutations.
_I answer that,_ To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a
person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in
restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment
of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice.
Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one
person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for
instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or
theft.
Reply Obj. 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly
speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is
a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another
what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution,
since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same
in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that
thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not
restitution properly so called.
Reply Obj. 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something
done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem
originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass
from one person to another, since they remain the same both
substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as
the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those
actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit
on an
|