ry to the very person of another, for instance by striking or
insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as
when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him.
Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the
things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of
distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be
distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the
subject of commutation between one person and another; and again
there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.
If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the
principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things,
and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For
distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice
directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of
these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when
anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will,
and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In
either case the offence may be committed against the other man's
chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the
offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is
called "theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against
another man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his
person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person,
a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or
poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or
maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured
secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is
deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of
law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a
man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most
part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be
induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly.
The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury
may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them
also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are
properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave
is his master's chattel, is referred to the
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