in from
forming a definite and fixed opinion." The third degree is when a
judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains
directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not
indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the
matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
witnesses.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another
without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does
him an injury.

Reply Obj. 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
operations, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 8, 10, 11; Q. 59, A. 1, ad
3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it
is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
anger to murder.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]

Whether Doubts Should Be Interpreted for the Best?

Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most
part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the
number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and
thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gen. 8:21).
Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for
the best.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he
leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things,
and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a
doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should
not be done.

Obj. 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with
regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the
worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it
seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be
interpreted for the worst.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him
not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in
the best sense."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), from the very fact
that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he