above about justice
(Q. 58, AA. 5, 6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an
inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to
have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such
as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a
particular vice opposed to particular justice.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human
common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to
which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be
iniquity.

Reply Obj. 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to
all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both
to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways
as stated above (Q. 58, A. 9, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral
matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to
another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in
the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and
the same applies to injustice.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 2]

Whether a Man Is Called Unjust Through Doing an Unjust Thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing
an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of justice is the
just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a
man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust
through doing an unjust thing.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not
be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is
unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he
does an unjust thing.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper
act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does
what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may
do an unjust thing without being unjust."

_I answer that,_ Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external thin