which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby
one renders to each man what is his.

Reply Obj. 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the
latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a
virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things,
it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas
justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
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QUESTION 59

OF INJUSTICE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?

(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?

(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?

(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]

Whether Injustice Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For
it is written (1 John 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever
committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now
iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a
kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as
inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But
injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it
is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness,
and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is
not a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the
will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus
Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a
special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

_I answer that,_ Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal
injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially
a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the
common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as
regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to
all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the
common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose
from injustice, in accord with what has been said