respect there is
dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is
similarity in all respects.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]
Whether We Can Suffer Injustice Willingly?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly.
For injustice is inequality, as stated above (A. 2). Now a man by
injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.
Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another.
But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily.
Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be
inflicted by himself.
Obj. 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for
having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished
according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable
burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man
can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a
man suffers injustice voluntarily.
Obj. 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers
that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one
who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it
is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice
voluntarily.
_On the contrary,_ To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore
on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
_I answer that,_ Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in
_Phys._ iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is
the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does
voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he
suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a
principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather
than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly
speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an
injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so
to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to
be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally),
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