ons but from external
things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations
are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral
virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: The common good is the end of each individual
member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of
each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end
of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to
the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions
whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than
particular justice which is directed to the good of another
individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in
the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law
commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the
actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle
person" (Ethic. v, 5).
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 10]

Whether the Mean of Justice Is the Real Mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real
mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now
moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice
observes the rational and not the real mean.

Obj. 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither
excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is
clearly the case with the virtues, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in _Ethic._
v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

Obj. 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe
the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean
varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one
is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case
in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same
punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice
also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the
mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical"
proportion, so that it is the real mean.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9; I-II, Q. 59, A. 4), the other
moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regula