e who sins
neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in
sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not
a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin has a determinate matter. But
negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither
about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence
if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done
negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that
negligence is not a special vice.

_On the contrary,_ Sins committed through negligence, are
distinguished from those which are committed through contempt.

_I answer that,_ Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every
lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence
is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin
according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain
sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is
about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of
their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of
matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since
every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then
solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9),
it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a
special sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because
the more we love (_diligimus_) a thing the more solicitous are we
about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for
every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every
virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an
act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence
just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of
reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in
any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the
lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is
found more or less in all sins.

Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good
that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done
negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of
goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of
solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.
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