t;

(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.

Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2)
Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether right is the object of justice?

(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive
right?

(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?

(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 1]

Whether Right Is the Object of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice.
For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that
"right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the
object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore
right is not the object of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind
of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence,
wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as
one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of
justice.

Obj. 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving
God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to
man." Now right (_jus_) does not pertain to Divine things, but only
to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_fas_ is the
Divine law, and _jus,_ the human law." Therefore right is not the
object of justice.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_jus_ (right) is
so called because it is just." Now the _just_ is the object of
justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are
agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men
capable of doing just actions."

_I answer that,_ It is proper to justice, as compared with the other
virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it
denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are
wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for
equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other
hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit
him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the
works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue
tends as to its proper object,