. Hence a father
is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them
there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal."
In like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and
servant, but that which is called "dominative." A wife, though she is
something belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him
as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is
nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his
father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind
of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between
husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave,
because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the
community of the household, as stated in _Polit._ i, 2, 5, it follows
that between them there is "domestic justice" rather than "civic."
Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right,
the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man
gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since
what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the
slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not
justice of father to son, or of master to slave.
Reply Obj. 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as
such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is
something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence
in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in
a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the
relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in
so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of
"right" or "just" is wanting to them.
Reply Obj. 3: All other differences between one person and another in
a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and
to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect
sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished according to
various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial,"
or "priestly" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of
the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or right of
"dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due to each
class of person in respect of his particular office.
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