ension,
and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Again the act of rendering his due to
each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because
sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider
the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the
reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible
as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A.
1).

Reply Obj. 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the
rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the
will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains
the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the
name of truth.

Reply Obj. 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on
the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one
thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation
to another, and this belongs to justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are
_rational by participation,_ but the entire _appetitive_ faculty, as
stated in _Ethic._ i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason.
Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can
be the subject of moral virtue.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]

Whether Justice Is a General Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For
justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7,
"She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude."
Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the
species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not
a general virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are
temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is
reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in
any way be reckoned a general virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above
(A. 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a
general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against
oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice
is every virtue."

_I answer that,_ Jus