as a general virtue, is
essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but
differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in
their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore
justice is essentially the same as every virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all
virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of
virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as
all virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that
virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of
temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be
directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the
acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the
common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single
individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all
virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of
the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without
use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be
so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that
does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good;
and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all
virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are
able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable
to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2)
that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the
virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is
general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.
Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and
it is possible to have one without the other.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First,
by _predication:_ thus "animal" is general in relation to man and
horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must
needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it
is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of
the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is
said to be
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