e."

Reply Obj. 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from _constraint,_ and
this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other
arises from the obligation of a _command,_ or from the necessity of
obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of
virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does
not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary
in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation,
according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to
me, for a necessity lieth upon me."

Reply Obj. 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by
making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings
with other men.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]

Whether Justice Is in the Will As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its
subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in
the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will
as its subject.

Obj. 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it
belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.
Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.

Obj. 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is
not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral
virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is
"rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the
concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore
justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and
concupiscible.

_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is
rectitude of the will observed for its own sake."

_I answer that,_ The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that
virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an
act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through
knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the
intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said
to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate
principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in
some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason
and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive appreh