LE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]

Whether Justice Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is
written (Luke 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that
are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done
that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a
virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a
profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition
of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a
virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is
not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious.
But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is
of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous
actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now
those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning
behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to
justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems
that justice is not a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire
structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance,
prudence, fortitude and justice.

_I answer that,_ A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and
man himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice.
For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason,
which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since
justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders
man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7),
good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he
says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all
in justice."

Reply Obj. 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the
person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing
him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what
he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously.
Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in
lif