ng "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good
counsel." Hence it is evident that _euboulia_ is a human virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an
evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even
as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in
coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence
both the aforesaid processes are contrary to _euboulia,_ as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does
not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his
parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which
counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive
appetite, which are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
are contingent.
Reply Obj. 3: In no sinner as such is _euboulia_ to be found: since
all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires
not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also
other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither
too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking
counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due
circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the
other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things
which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not
take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in
matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 2]
Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue
from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the
"prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this
belongs to _euboulia_ as stated above. Therefore _euboulia_ is not
distinct from prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are
specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q.
18, AA. 4, 6). N
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