e which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of
the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be
reckoned among those causes.
Obj. 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances
of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results
from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence;
for instance, reason, intelligence, docility, and so on, as stated
above (QQ. 48, 49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence,
so that it is not a special sin.
_On the contrary,_ Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above
(A. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is
one special vice.
_I answer that,_ A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways;
first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all
sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices,
which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be
general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated
of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as
neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with
special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by
participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just
as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs
them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no
sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason,
which defect belongs to imprudence.
If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in
some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin,
then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in
three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of
prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the
individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above
(Q. 48; Q. 50, A. 7), so also we distinguish various kinds of
imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of
prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the
several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which
_euboulia_ corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of
imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which _synesis_ (judging well
according to common law) and _gnome_ (judging well according to
general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconsta
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