virtue from
prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a
principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of
dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct
from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 3]

Whether _Synesis_ Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _synesis_ is not a virtue. Virtues
are not in us by nature, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. But _synesis_
is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11).
Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), _synesis_ is
nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can
be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it
seems that _synesis_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be
a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for
it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore _synesis_ be
reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is
no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and
consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable.
Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But
_euboulia_, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is
_synesis_ a virtue, as being good judgment.

_I answer that,_ _synesis_ signifies a right judgment, not indeed
about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters,
about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of
_synesis_ are said to be _synetoi,_ i.e. "persons of sense," or
_eusynetoi,_ i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand,
those who lack this virtue are called _asynetoi,_ i.e. "senseless."

Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at
research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing
to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of
imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such
persons sometimes lack good judgment (and t