ow _euboulia_ and prudence are directed to the same
end, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end,
but to the common end of all life. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a
distinct virtue from prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision
belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to
the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to
_euboulia,_ while decision belongs to prudence. There _euboulia_ is
not a distinct virtue from prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Prudence is preceptive, according to _Ethic._ vi,
10. But this does not apply to _euboulia_. Therefore _euboulia_ is a
distinct virtue from prudence.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), virtue is properly directed
to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ
according to different acts, especially when there is a different
kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same
kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the
goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all
these belong to the same virtue of charity.

Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor
have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different
causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good
command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.
Consequently _euboulia_ which makes man take good counsel must needs
be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And
since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal,
so _euboulia_ is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue,
without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the
moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by
commanding it, to _euboulia_ by eliciting it.

Reply Obj. 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the
one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for
counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The
last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the
other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have
certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the
discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty.
Hence this proves not that _euboulia_ is not a distinct