a special kind of
prudence called political.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals."
_I answer that,_ A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and
inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves
in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of
their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not
in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand,
men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the
commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their
free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required
in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their
superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is
called political.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species
of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of
regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence,
even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence
of a thing retains the name of "proper."
Reply Obj. 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
species of a habit, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now the same
actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect,
as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
Reply Obj. 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in
relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we
speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 3]
Whether a Part of Prudence Should Be Reckoned to Be Domestic?
Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a
part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5)
"prudence is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic
prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to
_Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is
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