elongs to a king who is charged
with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species
of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.

Reply Obj. 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q. 47, A. 5, ad 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the
common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance
of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong
most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign
and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the
earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and
execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species
of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is
executive.

Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in
_Ethic._ viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the
principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 2]

Whether Political Prudence Is Fittingly Accounted a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above (A. 1). But a part should not be reckoned a
species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as
what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as
regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence
distinct from regnative prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence
commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of