ble to the end in view
of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its
own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 8]

Whether Caution Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required.
Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib.
Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which
directs the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same
faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now
it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to
avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of
prudence, distinct from foresight.

Obj. 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore
caution does not belong to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."

_I answer that,_ The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety
of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil,
and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs
caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on
our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the
opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different
in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both
belong to the one virtue of prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
surprises of chance, so as t