ruities are discovered
rapidly."

Reply Obj. 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the
middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical
syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends
they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher
says (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9)
to prove that _euboulia_, i.e. good counsel, is not _eustochia_,
which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a
man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing,
and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in
taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for
instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this
reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters,
wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric
and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the
sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable
to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 5]

Whether Reason Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof.
But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned
a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be
reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom
and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason
should not be reckoned a part of prudence

Obj. 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from
the intelligence, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 8). If therefore
intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add
reason.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the
opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.

_I answer that,_ The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as
stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. Now counsel is a research