wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the
same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now
prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is
wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is
natural.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than
with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain
natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De
Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that
"intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it
therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an
intellectual virtue, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore prudence is in
us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.
_I answer that,_ As shown above (A. 3), prudence includes knowledge
both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which
prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards
the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of
speculative science, because the primary universal principles of
either are known naturally, as shown above (A. 6): except that the
common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the
speculative reason is better than that which is according to man":
whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the
speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from
nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through
teaching.
On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are
the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because
this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now
the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a
natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated
above (I-II, Q. 51, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1) that some, from a natural
inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right
ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment
about such like ends.
But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed,
are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and
affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever
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