jectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade
somewhat, and this belongs to _rhetoric._ It may be said, however,
that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it
argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from
probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.

The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having,
as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the
parts of prudence are _good counsel,_ which concerns counsel,
_synesis,_ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence,
and _gnome,_ which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the
law: while _prudence_ is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.

Reply Obj. 1: The various enumerations differ, either because
different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under
"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under
"understanding."

Reply Obj. 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as
sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply
may be gathered from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by
taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with
things pertaining to prudence.

Reply Obj. 4: Right command and right use always go together, because
the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the
lower powers, which pertain to use.

Reply Obj. 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
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QUESTION 49

OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Memory;

(2) Understanding or Intelligence;

(3) Docility;

(4) Shrewdness;

(5) Reason;

(6) Foresight;

(7) Circumspection;

(8) Caution.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 1]

Whether Memory Is a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For
memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the
sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.