as to lose them altogether, because
they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge
alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above
(A. 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies
the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation.
Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but
rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence":
wherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and
lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou
take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."
Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.
Reply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison
fails, as stated above [*Cf. I-II, Q. 53, A. 1].
Reply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from
memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of
universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3).
Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the
principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.
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QUESTION 48
OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE
(In One Article)
We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Which are the parts of prudence?
(2) Of its integral parts;
(3) Of its subjective parts;
(4) Of its potential parts.
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ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 48, Art.]
Whether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly Assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of
prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight."
Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus
ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding,"
"circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle
says (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and
"gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he
mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And
another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 80, Obj. 4] says that
ten things are c
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