_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), the
species of habits differ according to the difference of object
considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things
directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above
(I-II, Prolog.; Q. 102, A. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ
by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the
good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are
different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of
prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is
"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;
another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of
the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state or kingdom.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is
substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is
the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This
is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence,
i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called
"political," as being directed to the common good.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it
belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,"
wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good
ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs
specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated
by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).
Reply Obj. 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the
other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits
directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically
although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner,
though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the
many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits
differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed
to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 12]
Whether Prudence Is in Subjects, or Only in Their Rulers?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only
in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that
"prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues
are c
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