e contrary,_ In the foregoing definition of moral virtue
(A. 5, Obj. 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by
reason . . . even as a wise man decides."
_I answer that,_ The proper end of each moral virtue consists
precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends
that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his
concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right
judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is
appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason
dictates to each one that he should act according to reason.
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
directed to the end.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to
belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and
operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong
to virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends
to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in
all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of
nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this
purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 8]
Whether Command Is the Chief Act of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of
prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine
(De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid
ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the
prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to
command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been
said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 6). Therefore command is not the chief
act of prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to
rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other
powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the
reason. Therefore command is not an act of prude
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