LLECTUAL POWERS
(In Thirteen Articles)
The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head
there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?
(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?
(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?
(4) Whether it is something in the soul?
(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?
(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?
(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?
(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?
(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?
(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?
(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct
powers?
(12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?
(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 1]
Whether the Intellect Is a Power of the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the
soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the
same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the
essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not
relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect
is the essence of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united
in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the
appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's
powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united
in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence
and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of
the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension
(xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are
called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of
man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.
Obj. 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is
immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore
it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty
as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
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