immaterial act, as we have said above
of the intellect (Q. 76, A. 1); and therefore, as the intellect
understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so
also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual
act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion
of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the
intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood:
but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here"
and "now."

Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect
only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in
potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect
as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it
understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a
middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual
knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when
it does not understand in act.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 7]

Whether the Intellectual Memory Is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct
from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul
memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a
distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the
intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the
sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in
the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. 78, A.
4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the
intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7),
memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one
flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect
were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.

_On the contrary,_ From its nature the memory is the treasury or
storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes
this to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6, ad 1). Therefore the
memory is not another power from the intellect.

_I answer that,_ As has been said above (Q. 77, A. 3), the powers of
the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their
objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to
whic